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Abstract 
The June 2004 EU summit failed to solve the enlarged EU’s decision-making problems. Although the 
Constitutional Treaty’s double-majority voting rules would have maintained the enlarged EU’s ability to act, 
the botched Nice Treaty rules will continue to govern the Council’s decision-making up to November 2009. 
This failure will have important consequences since the Council, Commission and Parliament must make 
many tough decisions in the next five years and this will be extremely difficult under Nice Treaty voting 
procedures. Most importantly, these five years will be decisive in forming the public’s opinion on the 
enlarged EU. If the next five years see a series of deadlocks, bitter disputes and missed deadlines, EU citizens 
are likely to grow ever more disenchanted with the endeavour – and the position of the Eurosceptics ever 
stronger.  
Regardless of whether the Constitutional Treaty becomes law, the Nice Treaty rules will be in force during 
the critical, formative years of the new EU. In this sense, the most pressing task facing EU leaders is not to 
get the Constitutional Treaty ratified – it is to fix the Nice rules without a treaty change. 
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The Constitutional Treaty proposes a radical change in the Council of Ministers’ voting procedures, but these changes are 
postponed for five years. In this short essay, we evaluate the implications of three sets of voting rules that will govern 
Council decision-making in the years to come (see Figure 1). This essay first describes the voting rules (section 1) before 
evaluating their impact on members’ power and the EU’s ability to act (section 2) and providing our overall evaluation 
(section 3).  
Figure 1. Timeline for the various voting rules agreed at the June 2004 summit 
1.  What did they do? 
The Constitutional Treaty explicitly sets out two sets of Council voting procedures and implicitly recognises the current 
system set up by the Accession Treaty (Article 24): 
Up to November 2004, the pre-Treaty of Nice rules apply, i.e. qualified majority voting with weighted votes and the old 
majority threshold of 71% to win. The numbers of votes for the incumbent 15 member states are unchanged; those for the 10 
newcomers are a simple interpolation of EU-15 votes as specified in the Accession Treaty.  
From November 2004 to October 2009 the Nice Treaty rules apply (as per the Draft Council Decision relating to the 
implementation of Article I-24).  
•  The Nice rules maintain the basic ‘qualified majority voting’ framework, but add two extra criteria concerning the 
number of yes-voters and the population they represent. Specifically, the vote threshold is 72.2% of the Council votes 
(232 of the 321 votes), the member threshold is 50% of members (13 members), and the population threshold is 62% of 
the EU population.
1  
•  Additionally, the Nice rules redistributed votes in a way that heavily favoured the big and near-big members, as Figure 2 
shows; Spain and Poland won disproportionate increases. We call this the ‘Aznar bonus’.  
From November 2009, the new Constitutional Treaty (CT) rules will apply; weighted voting is out and double-majority is 
in. A winning coalition must represent at least 55% of EU members and 65% of the EU population. As a constraint on the 
blocking power of the biggest members, a blocking coalition must have at least four members (Germany plus any two of the 
six largest EU-27 members could block anything on the 65% threshold). This means that a qualified majority can be formed 
by a single, super majority consisting of all members but three. A last-minute summit compromise inserted the requirement 
that at least 15 members vote yes, but this is irrelevant; 15 members of 25 is 60% and thus greater than 55%, yet by the time 
these rules take effect, the EU should have 27 members and 55% of 27 is 15 (Bulgaria and Romania are pencilled in for 
membership in 2007). Thus the 15-member rule will be redundant when it takes effect. 
                                                 
1 The rules that take effect in November 2004 are not those agreed at the Nice summit, December 2000; the legally binding changes 
are in the Accession Treaty. Since EU leaders eventually realised how inefficient the Nice rules were, they improved efficiency by 
lowering the vote threshold from the 74% level set at Nice. 
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Figure 2. The Treaty of Nice and Accession Treaty reweighing of Council votes 
2.  Analysis of power and efficiency 
2.1  Winners and losers 
Measuring the power implications of a voting rule is a difficult business. It is, nevertheless, one that will be undertaken by 
proponents and opponents of the Constitutional Treaty alike, so it is helpful to have some objective measure of power, even 
one that fails to capture the full richness of political interactions.  
Here we present our calculations for a specific numerical measure of power, the NBI.
2 The general idea behind the NBI is 
simple. We use a computer to look at how likely it is that each member’s vote is crucial on a randomly drawn issue – crucial 
in the sense that its vote can make or break a winning coalition. We note that we used this measure to predict (in June 2003) 
that Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s draft Constitutional Treaty would be rejected.
3 
Nice Treaty power changes. The Nice Treaty rules will shift a great deal of power from small and medium-sized member 
states to the big and near-big member states (see Figure 3 for group definitions). While it was agreed in 2000, this power-
shift kicks in only at the end of 2004. Spain and Poland as a group see their slice of the ‘power pie’ rise by about 3.5 
percentage points – this is the fruit of the vote bonus agreed by Spanish President José María Aznar. The big-4’s slice 
expands by about the same amount. The extra power for the bigs and near-bigs comes at the expense of the mediums and 
smalls. 
                                                 
2 The particular measure is the ‘normalised Banzhaf index’ (NBI) invented by Penrose (1946) but named after its re-inventor, 
Banzhaf (1965). This measure cannot be worked out by hand since in the EU-25, there are over 33 million different line-ups of yes- 
and no-voters. In the EU-27, there are over 134 million. 
3 For a fuller explanation this and other technical issues, see Baldwin and Widgren (2004), Winners and Losers under Various 
Dual-Majority Rules for the EU’s Council of Ministers, CEPS Policy Brief No. 48, CEPS, Brussels, April. 
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Notes: The squares show the Council votes per nation under the current rules in effect till November 2004; the circles show 
the votes under the Nice rules; the line shows the percentage increase of the latter over the former. 
D = Germany, GB=Great Britain, F = France, I = Italy, E = Spain, Pl = Poland, NL = Netherlands, Gr = Greece, CR 
= Czech Republic, B = Belgium, H = Hungary, P = Portugal, S = Sweden, A = Austria, SR = Slovak Republic, DK 
= Denmark, Fin = Finland, Ire = Ireland, Li = Lithuania, La = Latvia, Slo = Slovenia, Es = Estonia, Cy = Cyprus, L 
= Luxembourg, M = Malta. 
Source: Accession Treaty, Act of Accession.  
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Notes: Big-4 = Germany, the UK, France, Italy; medium nations (populations of 25 to 5 million) are Romania, the 
Netherlands, Greece, the Czech Rep., Belgium, Portugal, Hungary, Sweden, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovak Rep., 
Denmark and Finland; small nations (populations less than 5 million) are Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. 
Figure 3. Winners and losers, big versus medium-sized and small member states  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitutional Treaty power changes. The Constitutional Treaty shifts even more power to the big-4, but this time, the 
near-bigs pay for the big-4’s gain (the big-4’s gain almost exactly matches the Spanish and Polish loss). We call this drop in 
Spanish and Polish power, agreed by the new Spanish President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the ‘Zapatero compromise’. 
When the Zapatero compromise kicks in after 2009, it will more than completely reverse the Aznar bonus, leaving these two 
near-big nations with a small drop in their combined power share. Small and medium-sized nations see little change in 
aggregate, but power shifts moderately from the mediums to the smalls. 
To summarise: 
The two-step voting-rule changes in the Nice and Constitutional Treaties will greatly boost the power of the 
EU’s four largest members (Germany, the UK, France and Italy). The 2004 jump in big-4 power will come at 
the expense of small and medium-sized members. The 2009 jump in big-4 power will come at the expense of 
Spain and Poland.  
 
Results by nation 
The CT will have to be ratified by each nation so the power implications by nation may be important in national debates.  
Changes in November 2004. The top panel of Figure 4 shows that each of the big and near-big members will see their 
power boosted substantially at the end of this year. By contrast, all the mediums and smalls will lose with the cuts being 
particularly marked for the Latvia, Slovenia and Estonia. The extra-large losses to these three nations are because of their 
low allocation of votes under the Nice rules. The Nice Treaty allocated votes ‘by hand’ and these three nations – with 1 to 2 
million people – were not at the table to argue their case. Without a natural benchmark-member at the table to fight for votes, 
these three fall-between nations were short-changed in the vote allocation undertaken by EU-15 leaders. 
Changes in November 2009. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows that the CT rules will shift even more power to Germany 
while taking a great deal of power away from Spain and Poland. In short, the Aznar bonus (Spain gained almost twice as 
much as France in the Nice-Treaty negotiations) will be more than offset by the Zapatero compromise when the CT rules 
take effect. Of course, President Zapatero is likely to be out of power by then, having enjoyed five years of the Aznar bonus. 
There are will also be important losses for the medium members. Somewhat unexpectedly, the tiny members will gain 
compared with the Nice Treaty rules.  BALDWIN AND WIDGRÉN | 5 
Figure 4. Winners and losers by member: Nice rules and CT rules 
 
Finally, we turn to the full analysis of power changes between today’s power distribution and the distribution that will be in 
effect when the Constitutional Treaty rules become operative. 
Figure 5. Winners and losers by member, the full effect, status quo to CT rules  
Change in power, status quo to Nice Rules, EU25
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Change in power, Nice rules to CT Rules, EU27
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Note: Change in percentage points. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Note: Change in percentage points. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The full effect, today versus November 2009. The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows the full shift that will occur between the 
voting rules in force today and the CT rules that come into effect in 2009. The salient features of our calculations are: 
•  The big-4 and especially Germany are the big winners from the piecemeal voting reform that has been going on since the 
IGC 2000.  
•  The biggest overall losers are not Spain and Poland, since the Zapatero compromise merely undoes the Aznar bonus. 
The biggest losers are the medium-sized members – nations with populations in the neighbourhood of 10 million. 
•  The near-big status that Spain and Poland won at Nice will be reversed; France, for example, will have about 40% more 
power than Spain. 
•  The Franco-German power equality will be ruptured; Germany will have about a third more power than France. The duo 
that drove European integration in the past will become an unequal partnership with France as the junior partner. Of 
course, French President Jacques Chirac, who agreed to this, is likely to be out of power by then – having finished out 
his term with Franco-German equality.  
To summarise: 
The Constitutional Treaty rules will break the traditional Franco-German power equality, making France the 
junior partner in the Franco-German alliance. Spain and Poland will lose the near-big status they won in the 
Nice Treaty. The biggest losers are the medium-sized members (with about 10 million citizens). The chief 
winners are the big-4 – Germany alone wins more than the other big-4s combined.  
2.2  Ability to act: Decision-making ‘efficiency’ 
The CT had to reform EU voting rules since the Nice Treaty rules were widely seen as unworkable, so a critical question is 
whether the enlarged EU be able to maintain its ability to act. Because the CT rules take effect only in November 2009, 
answering this question requires us to first examine the efficiency of the rules that will govern Council’s decision-making for 
the next five years.  
Figure 6. The enlarged EU’s ability to act 
 
It is widely appreciated that the Nice Treaty rules cripple the EU’s ability to act since they make it very difficult to find 
winning majorities.
4 Figure 6 confirms this. To provide some historical perspective, the five leftmost bars in the figure show 
the passage probability for qualified majority voting in historical EUs. Efficiency has been declining but past enlargements 
                                                 
4 For a complete analysis, see Baldwin et al. (2001), Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be Ratified?, CEPR, London. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
P
a
s
s
a
g
e
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Historical 21.9% 14.7% 13.7% 9.8% 7.8%
Status quo: May 04 to Nov 04 2.8%
Nice rules: Nov 04 to Nov 09 3.6% 2.1%
CT rules: Nov 09 onwards 10.1% 12.9% 11.2%
EU6 EU9 EU10 EU12 EU15 EU25 EU27 EU28
 
Notes: The figures show the ‘passage probability’, which measures the likelihood that a randomly selected issue would 
pass in the Council of Ministers. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. BALDWIN AND WIDGRÉN | 7 
only moderately hindered decision-making efficiency. The last enlargement lowered the probability from 10% to 8%, and the 
Iberian expansion lowered it from 14% to 10%. The figures also hide the fact that the Single European Act, which took 
effect in 1987, greatly boosted efficiency by implementing majority voting for Single Market issues.  
Looking forward, the figure shows that the EU is in for a big drop in its ability to act in normal Council matters, i.e. matters 
where qualified majority voting is in effect. We calculate that it will be about twice as hard to find a qualified majority in the 
enlarged EU as it was in the EU-15. The southeastern enlargement foreseen in 2007 will make matters slightly worse. Note 
that the Nice Treaty rules (as per the Accession Treaty) are slightly more efficient than the current rules since the massive 
concentration of power in the hands of the bigs and near-bigs improves efficiency (the six biggest nations in the EU-25 have 
half the power). 
By contrast, when the Constitutional Treaty’s rules come into force, the EU’s ability to act will soar. According to our 
calculations, the CT rules will make it easier to pass a proposal in the EU-27 than it was in the EU-12. The entrance of 
Turkey would do little to change this assessment.  
For comparison, we show how efficient the CT rules would be if they were applied immediately to the EU-25 instead of in 
2009. As the third set of bars from the right show, the CT rules would make it dramatically easier to obtain decisions in he 
Council of Ministers. 
To summarise: 
The Nice Treaty voting rules defined in the Accession Treaty that will apply until the end of 2009 will lower 
EU decision-making effectiveness to unprecedented levels in the EU-25 and EU-27. Finding a qualified 
majority in the enlarged EU will be about twice as hard as it was in the EU-15. The switch to the CT rules in 
2009 will involve a quantum leap forward in decision-making efficiency. It will be less difficult to find a 
qualified majority in the EU-27 than it was in the EU-12. 
 
3. Concluding  remarks 
This short essay argues that the June 2004 EU summit did not solve the enlarged EU’s decision-making problems. Although 
the voting rules in the Constitutional Treaty will maintain the enlarged EU’s ability to act, they will not take effect for five 
years. In the meantime, the botched Nice Treaty rules will govern Council decision-making – rules that are so flawed that EU 
leaders asked the European Convention to reform them even before they were implemented.  
This failure will have important consequences because the next five years are so critical. They will determine how the 
enlarged EU functions and how it is perceived to function. This period includes the whole life of the next Commission and 
the next European Parliament. During these years, the EU will have to make many extremely difficult decisions. For 
example, the structural and farm-spending programmes must be profoundly reformed if the newcomers are to be treated as 
equals (the pre-set 2005 and 2006 budget allocations for the 10 newcomers imply distinctly second-class treatment).
5  
Most importantly, these five years will be decisive when it comes to the public’s opinion on the enlarged EU. If the next five 
years see a series of deadlocks, bitter disputes and missed deadlines, EU citizens are likely to grow ever more disenchanted 
with the endeavour – and the position of the Eurosceptics ever stronger.  
Regardless of whether the Constitutional Treaty becomes law, the Nice Treaty rules will be in force during the critical, 
formative years of the new EU. In this sense, the most pressing task facing EU leaders is not to push the Constitutional 
Treaty past their voters, it is to fix the mistakes they made in Nice without a Treaty change.  
 
 
                                                 
5 See the December 2002 Danish Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1; on structural spending see European Commission, COM(2003) 
34 final, Table 11.  
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